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DEMOCRATIZING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional
legitimacy of the administrative state. By 1980, a majority of
Supreme Court Justices seemed poised to hold that large portions of
the administrative state are unconstitutional. In 1984, the Court
retreated from that abyss and took a major step toward legitimating
and democratizing the administrative state. It instructed lower
courts to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an
ambiguous agency-administered statute, basing this doctrine of
deference on the superior political accountability of agencies.
Henceforth, politically unaccountable judges were prohibited from
substituting their policy preferences for those of politically-
accountable agencies. The Court recognized that agencies are
politically accountable to the people because they are subject to the
control of the elected President.
The Court's 1984 effort to democratize the administrative state has
fallen far short of its potential because of temporal problems with the
manner in which the Supreme Court defines and implements both
the deference doctrine it announced in 1984, and the other two
doctrines that require courts to defer to agency interpretations of
agency-administered texts. The most important of those deference
doctrines is explicitly premised on the Court's understandable belief
that policy decisions should be made by the politically accountable
President rather than by politically unaccountable judges. Yet, the
Court's present method of implementing the deference doctrines has
two unfortunate effects. First, in a high proportion of cases, there is
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. I am grateful to the
participants in a work in progress workshop at George Washington University for providing
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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a lag of four to eight years between the time that a President takes
office and the time when a court is willing to acquiesce in
implementation of the policies preferred by the President. In other
words, each President is required to implement the policies preferred
by his predecessor for at least one term and perhaps even for two
terms. Second, in some important situations, regulatees are required
to incur large costs in enforcement actions to comply with
interpretations of agency rules that have already been rejected by the
incumbent President by the time courts impose the costs on the
regulatees, and that were disavowed by the agency at the time the
regulatees engaged in the conduct that is the basis for the
enforcement actions.
This Article explains why these results are unacceptable, and
proposes four changes in the Court's present methods of
implementing the deference doctrines that will eliminate these effects
and that will create a more democratic and constitutionally
legitimate administrative state in which Presidents actually have the
power to make changes in policy within the statutory boundaries set
by Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional
legitimacy of the administrative state.' By 1980, it appeared that a
majority of Supreme Court Justices were prepared to outlaw large
portions of the administrative state by holding that Congress
cannot delegate major policy decisions to "politically unresponsive
administrators."2 In 1984, however, the Supreme Court unani-
mously stepped back from that abyss and instead took a major step
toward legitimating and democratizing the administrative state.
In its opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Court recognized that Congress has the ultimate power
to define the terms it uses in statutory texts, but it went on to
require a court to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of
an ambiguous statute that Congress has instructed the agency to
implement.3 The Court made clear that Chevron deference is based
on constitutional principles that are central to our democratic
system of government-politically accountable agencies, rather than
politically unaccountable judges, should make the policy decisions
that are inherent in the process of giving meaning to ambiguous
texts that Congress has assigned agencies to implement.4
The Court anchored Chevron deference in the relationship
between agencies and the President. Thus, it explained:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
1. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
131-34 (1980); JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 78-80 (1978); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 93 (2d ed. 1979); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn
& Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63 (1982).
2. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in the judgment). In his concurring opinion in Industrial Union, Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Occupational Safety and Health Act was unconstitutional because
it was an impermissible attempt by Congress to delegate a major policy decision to "politically
unresponsive administrators." Id. The four-Justice plurality seemed to agree with Justice
Rehnquist when they concluded that the statute would be unconstitutional were it not for the
plurality's decision to give it a saving construction. See id. at 646 (plurality opinion).
3. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
4. See id. at 865-66.
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properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government
to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.5
The Court foreshadowed its 1984 recognition of the critical relation-
ship between agency policy decisions and the elected President in a
1983 opinion:
The agency's changed view ... seems to be related to the.
election of a new President of a different political party.... A
change in administration brought about by the people casting
their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs
and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the
bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess adminis-
trative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy
of the administration.6
The Court's methods of applying the Chevron doctrine and the
other doctrines that require politically unaccountable judges to defer
to politically accountable agencies, however, regularly yield results
that are inconsistent with the Court's attempt to infuse the
administrative state with principles of democracy.' As applied by
the Supreme Court, the deference doctrines typically require a court
to defer to the policy preferences of a President who left office years
ago rather than to the policy preferences of the person who was
elected to replace him.8 As a result of the Court's decisions with
respect to the scope of the deference doctrines, a newly elected
President has little chance of announcing any of his policies in a
form that a Court is willing to accept as worthy of deference during
5. Id.
6. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. See infra Parts II-IL.
8. See infra Parts II-III.
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a single term in office, and a President is unlikely to obtain judicial
acquiescence in all of his preferred policies even if he is reelected for
a second term.9
The cases discussed here to illustrate this phenomenon involve
situations in which courts required President Bush to implement
policies adopted by former President Clinton rather than the
policies preferred by President Bush. Some readers who dislike the
policy preferences of President Bush may consider this a socially
beneficial effect of the scope of the doctrines criticized in this Article.
That attitude, however, is short-sighted. If the Democrats retake the
White House in 2008, those same doctrines will require potential
President Hillary Clinton to implement many of the policies
preferred by former President Bush for all or most of her term of
office.
Chevron deference is implicitly based on the assumption that an
incumbent President obtains control of the federal bureaucracy
immediately upon taking the oath of office.'0 That, however, is well
known to be a counterfactual assumption. It typically takes many
months for a newly elected President to get "his people" installed in
all of the agency policymaking positions." It then takes those
neophyte political appointees many more months to figure out what
the agency is doing and to begin to implement the policies the
President prefers. 2
When the incumbent's preferred policies differ from those of
his predecessor, the process of changing policy is difficult and
time-consuming."' The President's appointees must identify and
implement means of reversing the powerful inertial forces that have
developed in the permanent bureaucracy in support of the policies
preferred by the President's predecessor in office." Even when the
newly elected President strongly disagrees with a policy adopted by
his predecessor, it may well take him a year or more just to begin
the process of switching to a policy that he, and presumptively a
9. See infra Parts II-Ill.
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Bush Seeks To Rule the Bureaucracy, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
2004, at A4.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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majority of the electorate, prefer.15 When the President's appointees
attempt to announce and to implement policies that are consistent
with the President's preferences, they often confront procedural
hurdles that typically take years to overcome before the President's
policy preferences can be announced in a manner that courts are
willing to accept.'6
The goal in this Article is to explore some of the issues courts
encounter when they are required to review agency policy decisions
during a period of change from the policies preferred by a prior
President to the policies preferred by the incumbent. This Article
suggests ways of addressing those issues that are consistent with
the constitutional bases for the deference doctrines as well as with
other important principles of administrative law and constitutional
law. It uses two contemporary disputes to illustrate the kinds of
questions that arise when a court is required to resolve a policy
dispute during such a time of transition.17
First, this Article discusses the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C.18 In that decision, the Court
refused to defer to the interpretation of an ambiguous agency-
administered statute urged by the Solicitor General (SG) on behalf
of the Bush Administration and instead upheld the contrary
interpretation previously adopted and applied by the agency during
the Clinton Administration. 9 Second, this Article discusses some
of the many court opinions handed down to date in the ongoing
multibillion dollar dispute over the meaning of the word "modifica-
tion" contained in the Clean Air Act.2 ° In resolving that dispute, a
court must choose whether to defer to an interpretation of an
ambiguous agency-administered statute adopted by the agency in
a rule issued in 2003 or to a 1999 agency interpretation of a pre-
existing ambiguous agency rule.2" The 2003 rule reflects the policy
preferences of President Bush, while the inherently inconsistent
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See infra Parts II-IL.
18. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
19. See id. at 452.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part III.A.
2006] 565
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1999 interpretation reflects the policy preferences of President
Clinton.22
Part I discusses the deference doctrines that are important in
resolving policy disputes of this type, their bases, their scopes, and
their corollaries. Part II describes the policy dispute that the
Supreme Court addressed in Dow and the opinions in which the
Court resolved that dispute. This Part then critiques the Court's
opinions. It concludes that the Court's decision was entirely
consistent with prevailing doctrine, but it is troubling that the Court
must thereby reject the policy preferred by the incumbent President
and approve instead the policy preferred by his predecessor, even
though the incumbent was elected more than four years prior to the
Court's decision.
Part III describes the policy dispute over the meaning of "modifi-
cation" in the Clean Air Act, as well as the numerous lower court
opinions that address the dispute. This Part then critiques the
courts' opinions. It concludes that if a court resolves that dispute by
applying prevailing doctrines, as the Supreme Court presumably
will do in the 2006-2007 Term,23 it will also reject the policy
preferred by the incumbent in favor of the policy favored by his
predecessor. That result is troubling both because of the long
time interval between the election of a President and judicial
acquiescence in his preferred policies, and because it seems
patently unfair in the context in which the dispute is being ad-
dressed by courts. In the many ongoing enforcement proceedings,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) encourages courts to
adopt a statutory interpretation it first promoted in 1999 during the
Clinton Administration, thereby requiring electric utilities to incur
many billions of dollars of regulatory costs.24 EPA recommends this
interpretation despite the fact that it urged the utilities to engage
in the conduct that allegedly triggered these massive regulatory
obligations. It adopted a contrary statutory interpretation under the
Carter Administration in 1980, and then formally rejected the 1999
interpretation in favor of the preexisting 1980 interpretation in
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. On May 15, 2006, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute. Envtl. Def. v.
Duke Energy Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2019 (2006).
24. See infra Part III.A.
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2003.25 It does not seem right to impose many billions of dollars of
regulatory costs on firms for engaging in conduct that would not
have been required under the interpretations in effect either at the
time the firms engaged in the conduct or at the present time.
Finally, Part IV proposes changes in doctrine that respond to the
two identified problems. This Part proposes one means of reducing
the long lag time between the election of a President and judicial
acquiescence in the policies he prefers. At present, the Supreme
Court instructs lower courts to defer to an agency policy announced
through the process of giving meaning to an ambiguous statute only
when the agency does so in a legislative rule or a decision issued in
a formal adjudication.2" It typically takes several years for an
agency to take either of those highly formalized actions.27 This Part
urges the Supreme Court to adopt instead the proposal of Justice
Scalia. He has long argued that the Court should defer to a policy
announced by an agency whenever it represents the agency's "fair
and considered judgment on the matter in question," even if the
agency makes the announcement through use of a procedure less
formal than a legislative rule or a decision issued in a formal
adjudication.2 ' Adoption of that approach would reduce by several
years the present intolerably long lag between the election of a new
President and judicial acquiescence in his preferred policies.
This Article proposes three ways to avoid the unfairness of
subjecting firms to high costs that arise when an agency claims, in
enforcement proceedings, that an ambiguous rule means something
dramatically different from both the meaning the agency attributed
to the rule when the firms engaged in the conduct at issue, and the
meaning the agency now gives the identical language in the statute
at issue. I attribute that result to the Supreme Court's 1944
instruction to lower courts to give "controlling effect" to agency
interpretations of ambiguous agency rules.2" To avoid the potential
25. See infra Part IIIA.
26. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1983).
Chevron deference also applies to some uncertain class of agency interpretations announced
through use of less formal procedures, but the Court has not explained how it will identify the
other circumstances in which Chevron deference is due an agency interpretation. See United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
27. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
28. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
29. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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unfair results this doctrine of deference can create, this Article
urges courts to adopt three practices that already have considerable
support in the case law. Courts should refuse to defer to agency
interpretations of ambiguous agency rules in three circumstances:
(1) when the interpretation is announced as a litigating position and
there is reason to believe that it does not represent "the agency's
fair and considered judgment on the matter in question"; ° (2) when
the agency interprets an open-ended rule that merely repeats the
vague language of the statute the rule purports to implement; and
(3) when the agency interpretation of the rule would require a
regulatee to incur large regulatory costs, and the interpretation
urged in the enforcement proceeding is inconsistent with the
interpretation in effect at the time the regulatee took the actions at
issue in the enforcement proceedings.
I. THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES
A. Chevron Deference
There are three deference doctrines that a court might be
required to apply when it reviews an agency policy decision in the
form of an interpretation of an ambiguous provision in an agency-
administered text. The Chevron doctrine requires a court to defer to
any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-
administered statute if the agency has adopted the interpretation
in a legislative rule or a formal adjudication.31 Chevron deference is
based on constitutional principles-politically unaccountable judges
cannot overrule policy decisions made by politically accountable
agencies.32
B. Skidmore Deference
If an agency announces an interpretation of an ambiguous
agency-administered statute through use of a procedure less formal
than a legislative rule or a formal adjudication,33 the agency
30. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
31. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-31.
32. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
33. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
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interpretation is due the weaker and more contingent type of
deference the Court announced in its 1944 decision in Skidmore v.
Swift & Co. 4 Under Skidmore, the deference due an agency
interpretation varies "with circumstances, and courts have looked
to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's
position."35 Skidmore deference is based on an agency's comparative
advantage in terms of its subject-matter expertise, rather than on
an agency's comparative advantage with respect to its political
accountability.36
C. Seminole Rock Deference
Seminole Rock deference applies to an agency's interpretation of
one of its rules, rather than to a statute the agency administers. 7
Seminole Rock deference is about as strong as Chevron deference."
In Chevron, the Court instructed courts to uphold any agency
interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute as long
as it is reasonable, meaning not "arbitrary [and] capricious."3 In
Seminole Rock, the Court instructed reviewing courts to give an
agency interpretation of an agency rule "controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."4 ° Those
two deference rules are stated in slightly different ways, but they
are functionally indistinguishable.41 The Court did not describe the
basis for Seminole Rock deference in its 1945 opinion, but the Court
has identified two bases for the doctrine in its subsequent opinions.
Sometimes the Court has said that Seminole Rock deference is
based on the same constitutional/political accountability consider-
34. 323 U.S. at 140.
35. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted); see Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
36. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
37. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). The Court
applied Seminole Rock deference in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Since then, the
Supreme Court, many lower courts, and many scholars have begun to refer to Seminole Rock
deference as Auer deference.
38. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 612,627-29 (1996) (noting the similarities
between Seminole Rock and Chevron deference).
39. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
40. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.
41. See Manning, supra note 38, at 627-29.
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ations as Chevron deference.42 In other cases, the Court has said
that it is based on the same considerations of relative subject-matter
expertise as Skidmore.43
D. Differences Between the Deference Doctrines
The courts have announced corollaries to two of the deference
doctrines that logically follow from the quite different bases for
each. For instance, Chevron deference applies only to a statutory
interpretation adopted by an agency that Congress has authorized
to make policy decisions in the process of implementing a statute;
44
Chevron deference does not apply when an agency adopts an
interpretation of a statute based on the agency's interpretation of
court opinions; 4 and Chevron deference applies with as much
strength to an agency decision to change its interpretation of an
ambiguous agency-administered statute as to an agency decision to
adhere to a previously announced interpretation.46 Each of those
corollaries follows logically from the basis for Chevron deference. An
agency that does not have the power to make policy decisions is not
entitled to judicial deference when it exceeds its statutory authority
by attempting to make a legally binding policy decision. Similarly,
an agency that adopts a statutory interpretation based on its
interpretation of judicial decisions is not entitled to deference,
because its interpretation is not based on a policy decision.
The last of the three corollaries to the Chevron doctrine is
particularly important. By instructing courts to confer as much
deference on changes in preexisting agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes as on reaffirmations of long-standing interpre-
tations, the Supreme Court recognizes the need to allow any newly
elected President to change government policies within the bound-
aries set by Congress. It would be inconsistent with the fundamen-
tal tenets of democratic government to force a President to adhere
42. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1991).
43. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).
44. See id.
45. Akins v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) ("There is ... no reason for courts ... to defer to agency
interpretation of the Court's opinions.").
46. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).
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to the policies of his predecessor, particularly when Congress wrote
a statute that delegates policymaking power to an agency in terms
that permit a President to adopt either his preferred policies or
those of his predecessor. People vote in presidential elections
because they favor one candidate's policy preferences to those of his
opponent. The courts should not be in the business of blocking
implementation of the policies presumptively preferred by the
electorate, except in the rare case in which those policy preferences
violate the Constitution.
By contrast, the Skidmore doctrine makes the extent of the
deference due an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous agency-
administered statute depend, to some degree, on the agency's
consistency in interpreting the statute over time. 4' That approach
makes sense when deference is based on the presumed comparative
advantage of an agency's specialized subject-matter expertise; an
expertise required to apply a statute to a complicated field of
science. Inconsistency in an agency's treatment of the same
scientific dispute naturally tends to reduce the credibility of the
agency's claim of superior subject matter expertise.48 If the Food and
Drug Administration, for instance, were to express the same opinion
with respect to some important scientific principle every two years
over a period of forty years, any judge is more likely to accept the
agency's opinion on that issue than if the agency vacillates between
two inconsistent opinions every other year for forty years.
The Court has not said much about the role of consistency in
deciding whether to defer to an agency's interpretation of an agency
rule. The Court's failure to address that question in a definitive way
fits with the Court's multiple explanations for the Seminole Rock
doctrine.49 To the extent that Seminole Rock deference is based on
an agency's presumed superior political accountability for policy
decisions, the doctrine should apply with equal strength to new
interpretations that change preexisting interpretations and to
interpretations that an agency has consistently held over a long
period of time. By contrast, if Seminole Rock deference is based on
an agency's presumed subject-matter expertise, a court should
47. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
48. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
49. See supra Part I.C.
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confer more deference on an agency's consistent and longstanding
interpretation of a rule.
The next two Parts of this Article will describe two policy disputes
that illustrate the nature of problems courts confront when required
to review agency policy decisions at a time of transition from one
presidential administration to another. This Article then will
critique the opinions courts have issued to grapple with those
disputes. Each Part begins with a doctrinal critique of the opinions.
The first part of each critique will ask whether the reasoning and
result in each case is based on an accurate application of prevailing
doctrines. That part of each critique will assume that prevailing
doctrines make sense in their substance, scope, and corollaries. The
second part of each critique will discuss whether prevailing
doctrines should be changed in some way.
II. THE SCOPE OF EPA PREEMPTION OF STATE PESTICIDE
REGULATION
A. The Policy Dispute
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
authorizes EPA to regulate pesticides.5" FIFRA requires a manufac-
turer to apply to register a pesticide with EPA.5 1 The statute
instructs EPA to approve an application to register a pesticide if,
and only if, EPA determines that the pesticide "will not generally
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." 2 The
manufacturer must include its proposed product labeling with its
application, and the statute instructs EPA to approve the proposed
labeling if, and only if, it complies with the statutory prohibition on
mislabeling.53
FIFRA also preempts some, but not all, state regulation of
pesticides.5 4 Like most preemption provisions in statutes authoriz-
ing a federal agency to regulate some subject matter, the preemp-
50. See 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
51. See id. § 136a(a).
52. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(D).
53. See id. § 136a(c)(5)(B); id. § 136a(c)(9)(B) ("[Proposed] labeling information ... shall not
be false or misleading ....").
54. See id. § 136v(a) (allowing for state regulation that does not conflict with FIFRA).
[Vol. 48:559
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tion provision in FIFRA is extremely difficult to interpret and apply.
The preemption provision poses particularly difficult problems in
the context of indirect state regulation accomplished through use of
tort suits based on state law. FIFRA authorizes a state to regulate
a federally registered pesticide by prohibiting its use for some
purpose that would otherwise be permissible pursuant to its federal
registration, and/or by approving its use for some purpose that
otherwise would not be authorized by its federal registration but is
not prohibited by the federal registration.55 In addition, FIFRA has
another preemption provision that has produced a great deal of
litigation: "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required under this subchapter."56
EPA has taken several actions relating to the scope and effect of
the statutory prohibition on state labeling requirements that are "in
addition to or different from" EPA-approved labeling of a registered
product. First, in 1978 EPA sought and obtained from Congress a
statutory amendment that empowered EPA to waive the preexist-
ing statutory requirement that it register a pesticide only if it
determined that the pesticide was effective for its intended use.5
7
EPA convinced Congress that it lacked the resources required to
determine whether a pesticide was effective, or to evaluate the
efficacy claims a manufacturer made in its proposed labeling. 8 In
1979, EPA exercised the waiver power granted by Congress and
issued a rule in which it waived all regulation of pesticide efficacy.59
In a 1996 public notice, "EPA confirmed that it had 'stopped eval-
uating pesticide efficacy for routine label approvals almost two
decades ago,"' and that "EPA's approval of a pesticide label does not
reflect any determination on the part of EPA that the pesticide will
be efficacious or will not damage crops or cause other property
damage. 6 °
55. Id. § 136v(a), (c)(1).
56. Id. § 136v(b).
57. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 440 (2005) (describing the amendment
to FIFRA).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Pesticide Registration Notice 96-4, http://www.epa.gov/opppmsdl/PR
Notices/pr96-4.html (June 3, 1996)).
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In 2000, the Clinton-era EPA interpreted the FIFRA prohibition
on state labeling that is "in addition to or different from" EPA-
approved labeling, in such a way as to not preempt state tort suits
that are based on alleged misbranding of a pesticide where the
alleged misbranding relates to efficacy, crop damage, or other
property damage.6 EPA announced that interpretation in the form
of an amicus brief it filed in state court.6 2 In 2003 and 2004, the SG
under President Bush announced that "the United States" had
determined that it erred when it earlier interpreted FIFRA to be
consistent with such state tort actions.63 In two amicus briefs
submitted to the Supreme Court, the SG stated that "the United
States" now interpreted FIFRA to prohibit such state tort suits.6
The SG explained that the government's change in interpretation
was based on its examination of several judicial opinions in which
courts had rejected EPA's earlier interpretation.6
B. Supreme Court Opinions Addressing the Pesticide Regulation
Preemption Issue
Scores of court opinions address the pesticide regulation pre-
emption issue described in Part II.A.6 6 This Article will describe
only the opinions issued in the case that reached the Supreme
Court in 2004.67 That dispute arose as a result of crop damage
allegedly caused by a pesticide named Strongarm made by Dow
Agrosciences.6" Dow applied to register Strongarm for application to
peanut crops and proposed labeling that included the statement:
"Use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas where peanuts are
grown."6 9 EPA granted the application for registration and approved
the proposed labeling.7" When peanut farmers in west Texas applied
61. See id. at 436-37 (describing the conflicting views on preemption).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 449.
64. See id. at 449 & n.24.
65. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, Bates
v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (No. 03-388) [hereinafter Brief for the United
States].
66. See id.
67. See id. at 431.
68. Id. at 435.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Strongarm to their crops, it stunted the growth of the peanuts
because of its interaction with soil with a pH in excess of 7.0."' After
the farmers complained to Dow, it re-registered Strongarm with a
new label that included this statement: "Do not apply Strongarm to
soils with a pH of 7.2 or greater."" The peanut farmers who had
already suffered crop damage attributable to their use of Strongarm
on peanut crops grown in high-pH soil then sued Dow in state court
for, inter alia, failure to warn and fraud. 3 The farmers claimed that
Dow "knew, or should have known," that Strongarm would damage
peanut crops grown in high-pH soil and affirmatively misled
farmers by stating in its labeling that Strongarm should be used in
all soil conditions. 4
Dow filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court, arguing
that the farmers' complaint under state tort law was preempted by
FIFRA.7 ' The district court granted summary judgment for Dow,
and the Fifth Circuit upheld that decision.7 ' The circuit court
reasoned that application of state tort law to the facts of the case
would violate the statutory prohibition on state-required "labeling
... 'in addition to or different from"' the labeling required by EPA
because a jury verdict against Dow based on fraud or failure to warn
"would induce it to alter its product label. 77
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the circuit court.78 The
Supreme Court held that a state tort verdict against'Dow based on
failure to warn or fraud is not preempted by FIFRA as long as state
tort law imposes a duty to warn that is equivalent to the FIFRA
prohibition on mislabeling.79 FIFRA defines mislabeling to include
false or misleading statements and inadequate instructions, so the
Court thought it was entirely plausible that state tort law would
impose labeling requirements equivalent to the requirements
imposed by FIFRA. °
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 435-36.
74. See id. at 435.
75. See id.
76. See Dow Agrosciences v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 331.
78. See Dow, 544 U.S. at 454.
79. Id. at 453.
80. See id.
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The Court rejected the interpretation urged by the SG for several
reasons. First, it rejected the SG's argument that the statute
unambiguously preempts all tort actions based on failure to warn.81
The Court concluded that "imposition of state sanctions ... that
merely duplicate federal requirements is equally consistent with the
text."82 It characterized the government's interpretation as "particu-
larly dubious given that just five years ago the United States
advocated the interpretation that we adopt today."83 Second, the
Court noted that "for much of [the period in which FIFRA has been
in effect,] EPA appears to have welcomed these tort suits"8' 4 because
they "would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of
FIFRA."8 Third, the Court rejected the government's argument that
any labeling requirement imposed by state tort law necessarily
would be "in addition to or different from" the labeling EPA
approved, because EPA specifically disavowed any role in approving
labeling based on considerations of product efficacy or risk of
damage to crops-the subjects of the state tort complaint.86 Fourth,
after concluding that the statute was ambiguous, the Court applied
the canon of construction that requires a court to interpret ambigu-
ous language in a statute in a manner that disfavors preemption. 7
Finally, the Court noted that "[s]tate-law requirements must also be
measured against any relevant EPA regulations that give content
to FIFRA's misbranding standards."
Three Justices joined in two separate opinions in Dow. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer emphasized the final point the
Court made in its opinion-that the preemptive effect of an agency-
administered statute depends critically on the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute: "[A]n administrative agency ... ha[s] the legal
authority within ordinary administrative constraints to promulgate
agency rules and to determine the pre-emptive effect of those rules
in light of the agency's special understanding of 'whether (or the
extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal
81. See id. at 442-44.
82. Id. at 442.
83. Id. at 449.
84. Id. at 452.
85. Id. at 451.
86. Id. at 448.
87. Id. at 449.
88. Id. at 453.
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objectives.""'9 Justices Thomas and Scalia stated their agreement
with the Court's opinion in most respects but they expressed
their disagreement on one important point: "[T]he majority states
that the presumption against pre-emption requires choosing the
interpretation ... that disfavors pre-emption. That presumption does
not apply, however, when Congress has included within a statute an
express pre-emption provision."9 °
C. Doctrinal Critique of the Dow Opinion
With one exception, the Supreme Court's opinion in Dow is
doctrinally sound. The Court began by concluding that the preemp-
tion provision of FIFRA, which prohibits a state from imposing a
pesticide-labeling requirement that is in addition to or different
from a labeling requirement imposed by EPA, is ambiguous in its
potential application to a tort suit in which a party alleges that the
pesticide manufacturer committed fraud or failed to warn of a
known adverse effect of a use of the pesticide in the form of the risk
of damage to crops caused by the pesticide.91 That conclusion was
well supported in the Court's opinion. The Court reasoned that if
applicable state tort law imposes a duty to warn that has the same
meaning as FIFRA's prohibition on mislabeling a pesticide, the
action of a state court in enforcing the duty to warn is not in
addition to or different from the requirements imposed by FIFRA.92
In that entirely plausible situation, the Court reasoned that "the
imposition of state sanctions for violating state rules that merely
duplicate federal requirements is equally consistent with the text of
[that preemption provision],"" and that "[p]rivate remedies that
enforce federal misbranding requirements would seem to aid, rather
than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA."94
The Court refused to defer to the SG's interpretation of FIFRA to
preempt all state tort actions that are based on an alleged failure to
89. Id. at 454 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506
(1996)).
90. Id. at 457 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
91. See id. at 441-42.
92. Id. at 443-48.
93. Id. at 442.
94. Id. at 451.
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warn.9" The Court's refusal to confer Chevron deference on the SG's
interpretation was doctrinally sound on three different bases. First,
courts have consistently held that Chevron deference is due only a
statutory interpretation adopted by the agency Congress charged to
make the policy decisions required to implement a statute.96
Congress has given EPA, not the SG, that policymaking power.
Second, the Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference is due
to only an agency interpretation announced in a legislative rule or
an opinion issued in a formal adjudication.97 The SG's interpretation
was announced only in a brief, and Congress has never authorized
any agency to make a legally binding decision in the process of
writing a brief. Third, courts have held that a court never owes
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation that is based on the
agency's analysis of judicial decisions, rather than an agency policy
decision,98 and the SG stated that his interpretation was based on
his analysis of prior court opinions that rejected EPA's interpreta-
tion.99
The Court was also on firm doctrinal ground when it declined to
confer Skidmore deference on the SG's interpretation. The SG's
interpretation fails to qualify for deference by reference to all of the
criteria the Court uses to decide whether to confer Skidmore
deference on an agency interpretation." ° The SG announced his
interpretation in an informal instrument. 1° The SG has no compar-
ative advantage vis-A-vis a court with respect to the subject matter
of FIFRA regulation. The SG's interpretation was not a long and
consistently held interpretation; rather, it contradicted EPA's long-
held contrary interpretation.0 2 Finally, the SG's interpretation was
not supported with persuasive reasoning; instead of discussing the
95. Id. ("Dow and the United States exaggerate the disruptive effects of using common-
law suits to enforce the prohibition on misbranding.").
96. See Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 152
(1991). See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5 (4th ed. 2002)
(discussing the scope of Chevron).
97. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
98. See Akins v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
99. Brief for the United States, supra note 65, at 20.
100. The criteria for application of Skidmore deference are set forth in Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1944), and United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229-31.
101. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 & n.24 (2005).
102. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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policy reasons in support of his interpretation, the SG referred only
to his agreement with an opinion of the California Supreme
Court. 1
0 3
After the Court concluded that the FIFRA preemption provision
is ambiguous and after it refused to defer to the SG's interpretation
of that provision, the Court invoked the canon of construction that
requires a court to interpret preemption provisions narrowly to
support its interpretation of the preemption provision of FIFRA. °4
That was a doctrinal error. As Justices Thomas and Scalia pointed
out in their separate opinion, the canon of construction the Court
invoked applies only when a statute is silent or ambiguous on the
question of whether Congress intended to preempt state law.05 The
Court does not apply that canon when Congress explicitly preempts
state actions and the question before a court is the scope of that
preemption provision."10 As Justice Breyer emphasized in his
separate opinion, when Congress includes a preemption provision
in an agency-administered statute, and that provision is ambiguous
with respect to its potential application to some class of state
actions, the Court defers to any reasonable agency interpretation of
the ambiguous preemption provision.0 7
That doctrinal flaw in the Court's opinion in Dow is harmless,
however, for two reasons. First, it had no effect on the outcome of
the proceeding, as the separate opinions of Justices Thomas, Scalia,
and Breyer recognized. 08 Second, even though the Court based its
interpretation of the statute on an inapplicable canon rather than
on deference to the agency, the Court made it clear that it was
greatly influenced by the agency's interpretation. 0 9 The Court
referred to EPA actions that influenced its decisionmaking in three
different passages."0 First, it referred to EPA's 1996 Notice-that
it had not regulated labeling claims related to crop damage in
103. See Brief for United States, supra note 65, at 20.
104. See Dow, 544 U.S. at 449.
105. Id. at 457 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 454-55 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 867-68 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 103 (2000).
108. See Dow, 544 U.S. at 454-55 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 457 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
109. See id. at 450-53 (majority opinion).
110. See id.
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decades-to refute the argument that a plaintiffs victory based on
an alleged failure to warn about risks to crops would conflict with
EPA's implementation of FIFRA."' Second, the Court rejected the
argument that allowing the state tort action to proceed would
frustrate the purposes of FIFRA by referring to the fact that, until
the SG decided to change the government's position, "EPA appears
to have welcomed these tort suits.""' 2 Third, the Court ended its
opinion with the recognition that "[s]tate-law requirements must
also be measured against any relevant EPA regulations that give
content to FIFRA's misbranding standards.""'
It is likely that the Court would retreat quickly and unanimously
from the one instance in which its opinion in Dow is doctrinally
flawed if it were presented with a case in which invocation of the
narrowing canon conflicted with deference to a reasonable agency
interpretation of the FIFRA preemption provision. If, for instance,
EPA were to issue a rule in which it announced that it was resum-
ing its pre-1979 practice of regulating pesticide labeling, with
reference to the risks that pesticides pose to crops, and that it
considered all pesticide-labeling requirements imposed by states to
be impermissible impositions of requirements "in addition to or
different from" the labeling requirements EPA mandated under
FIFRA, the Court likely would uphold that rule as a reasonable
interpretation of the ambiguous preemption provision of FIFRA." 4
111. See Dow, 544 U.S. at 450-51.
112. Id. at 452.
113. Id. at 453.
114. A hypothetical variation on the facts of Dow will suffice to illustrate this point.
Imagine that Congress increases EPA's resources to implement FIFRA to the extent necessary
for EPA to return to its pre-1979 practice of regulating the efficacy of pesticides and the risks
that pesticides pose to crops. Imagine that EPA then revokes the waiver it issued in 1979 and
announces that, henceforth, it will investigate with care the efficacy of each new pesticide that
is the subject of a pesticide registration application. EPA also states that it will approve the
labeling of any such pesticide if, but only if, it concludes that all claims of efficacy are accurate
and that any risks the pesticide poses to crops are disclosed in the labeling EPA approves for
the pesticide. Imagine that EPA then issues a rule stating that, as a result of the changes
EPA has made in its methods of implementing the FIFRA prohibition on misbranding, EPA
has concluded that the preemption provision of FIFRA should be interpreted more broadly;
specifically, EPA has concluded that any labeling requirement imposed by a state is
inherently "in addition to or different from" FIFRA's if the state attempts to impose that
requirement on a pesticide, the labeling of which EPA approved after it announced the
expansion in the scope of its regulation of pesticide labeling. EPA explains further that its
new comprehensive method of regulating pesticide labeling will be most effective if it is
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D. Normative Critique of the Dow Opinion
The preceding section criticized the Court's opinion in Dow for
relying on an inapplicable canon of construction, rather than on
deference to EPA, as the basis for its holding that FIFRA does not
preempt a state tort action that is based on an alleged failure to
warn of a known risk to crops posed by a pesticide." 5 It went on,
however, to conclude that the opinion was doctrinally sound if the
reasoning of the three concurring Justices is substituted for the
Court's erroneous reliance on an inapplicable canon of construction
in its opinion, with no resulting change in outcome." 6 This Section
will broaden the bases for that critique to question whether the
doctrines that the Court properly applied are normatively appropri-
ate in their substance and scope." 7
There is little to criticize in the substance of the doctrines the
Court applied in Dow. Generally, the doctrines are well thought out
and fit well in the context of a government in which agencies make
exclusive and uniform, and that allowing state judges and juries who lack any relevant
expertise to second-guess EPA labeling decisions would create a chaotic regulatory
environment in which pesticide manufacturers would not know which of several potentially
conflicting authorities to follow. Without exclusive and uniform regulations, pesticide
manufacturers would incur unnecessary costs of compliance with as many as fifty-one
different labeling regimes, and consumers would confront a bewildering array of labels and
warnings, many of which are based on a lay judge or juror's mistaken beliefs about the
characteristics of a pesticide.
In this hypothetical situation, the Supreme Court doubtlessly would ignore its own
erroneous earlier reference to the inapplicable canon of construction in Dow. It would instead
apply the reasoning in the Thomas, Scalia, and Breyer opinions as the basis for a unanimous
holding that FIFRA preempts any tort action against a pesticide manufacturer that is based
on an alleged failure to warn users about risks to crops if the suit is brought against the
manufacturer of a pesticide, the labeling of which was approved by EPA after it began to
regulate the contents of proposed labeling related to risks of crop damage. Several passages
in the Court's opinion foreshadow this resolution of the hypothetical variation on the facts of
Dow. The Court notes that FIFRA "pre-empts competing state labeling standards," id. at 452;
that FIFRA preempts "any statutory or common-law rule that would impose a labeling
requirement that diverges from those set out in FIFRA and its implementing regulations," id.;
and, that "[t]o the extent that EPA promulgates such regulations in the future, they will
necessarily affect the scope of pre-emption," id. at 453 n.28. That opinion would be entirely
consistent with, and required by, all of the current administrative law doctrines. It would be
analogous to the Court's opinions in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-68
(2000), and United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 103 (2000).
115. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
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a high proportion of policy decisions under broad authority dele-
gated by Congress, subject to supervision by the politically account-
able President and review by politically unaccountable courts.11
One effect of the application of those doctrines in Dow, however, is
cause for concern. The Court rejected the policy preferred by the
incumbent President and upheld instead the policy preferred by his
predecessor, even though the incumbent was elected more than four
years before the Court decided the case."'9 The Court's adopted
doctrines may not be normatively appropriate if, and to the extent
that, they frustrate the will of the electorate by increasing substan-
tially the time between the election of a President whose policy
preferences differ from those of his predecessor and the time when
he is able to replace his predecessor's policies with those he prefers.
We can improve the fit between the deference doctrines and the
performance of our democracy by changing the scope of the defer-
ence doctrines.
E. Potential Changes in Doctrine
One potential change in doctrine would require a reviewing court
to defer to the SG's interpretation of an ambiguous provision in an
agency-administered statute when the SG adopts, announces, and
urges a court to support an interpretation that differs from the
agency's interpretation. In his concurring opinion in Christensen v.
Harris County, Justice Scalia suggested that courts should defer to
interpretations urged by the SG in amicus briefs. 2 ' That change in
doctrine would have required the Court to uphold the incumbent
President's preferred policy rather than the policy preferred by his
predecessor in Dow.
Deferring to the SG, rather than the agency, has one appealing
characteristic if measured with reference to the political and consti-
tutional values that provide the underpinnings of Chevron defer-
118. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
119. See supra notes 60-64, 81-88 and accompanying text.
120. 529 U.S. 576, 591 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia qualified his position, however, by referring to a situation in which
the SG represents that the head of the agency responsible for administering the statute at
issue has adopted the interpretation urged by the SG. See id. It is not clear that he would
defer to the SG's interpretation in a case like Dow, in which the SG makes no representation
that EPA has adopted the interpretation the SG urges.
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ence. The SG typically is one of the members of an Administration
who is particularly close to the President.12' When the SG supports
a policy that differs from the policy adopted by an agency, the policy
urged by the SG is far more likely to reflect the President's policy
preferences than the policy adopted by the agency. Moreover, even
if the SG and the agency share a preference for the policy preferred
by the President, the agency cannot announce its preference in a
form that entitles it to Chevron deference for several years after the
agency adopts that preference.'22 The Supreme Court has instructed
reviewing courts to confer Chevron deference only on agency
interpretations announced in legislative rules or in decisions
issued in formal adjudications. 2 ' It usually takes years for an
agency to announce a new policy consistent with the President's
policy preferences in a notice-and-comment rulemaking or a formal
adjudication.'24 By contrast, the SG can announce a statutory
interpretation that reflects the President's policy preferences in the
briefs he files with courts shortly after the President takes office.' 25
On balance, however, it would be a mistake to adopt a doctrine of
deference to the SG. Such a doctrine would have many disadvan-
tages. The Chevron doctrine recognizes and gives effect to the power
of the President in the overall context of a constitutional democracy
in which Congress has the ultimate power to make the vast majority
of policy decisions. 126 In that context, Chevron deference makes
sense. The President, however, is not the only politically account-
able institution. Congress is also politically accountable, and, as
the Court recognized in step one of the two-part Chevron test,
121. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Olson's Return Spans Huge Victory, Deep Loss, USA TODAY,
Oct. 2, 2003, at Al (describing Solicitor General Theodore Olson's personal and political ties
to President George W. Bush).
122. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59, 60 (1995) (describing the multiyear process required to issue a major rule); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking for Formulating and
Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1979) (describing the multiyear process
required to complete a major formal adjudication).
123. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
124. See supra note 122.
125. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 65, at 20.
126. The Court said: "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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Congress's preferences trump those of the President when it acts
through use of the legislative process.'27 It would not be consistent
with recognition of legislative supremacy to extend Chevron
deference to SG interpretations of agency-administered statutes.
Congress has never delegated to the SG the power to make the
policy decisions necessary to implement FIFRA. 12
8
Another potential change in doctrine would broaden the scope of
Chevron deference to include agency interpretations adopted and
announced through use of procedures less formal than notice and
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. Since 2000, Justices
Souter and Scalia have engaged in a lively debate about the
appropriate scope of Chevron deference.'29 Justice Souter has urged
the Court to confer Chevron deference only on agency interpreta-
tions announced in legislative rules, formal adjudications, and some
uncertain set of less formal procedures if Congress has indicated an
intent to authorize an agency to announce a legally binding
interpretation through use of that procedure. 8° Justice Scalia has
urged the Court to confer Chevron deference on any agency
interpretation announced through any means as long as it repre-
sents the agency's "fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question."'' So far, Justice Souter has been successful in persuad-
ing a majority of the Court to adopt his views on the appropriate
scope of Chevron deference. 1 2
This Article's focus on the temporal effects of administrative law
doctrines places the Souter-Scalia debate in a new light. The narrow
scope of Justice Souter's approach to Chevron produces a situation
in which a newly elected President, with policy preferences that
differ from those of his predecessor, is unlikely to get most of his
preferred policies approved by courts and in effect during his first
127. See id. at 842 (deferring to Congress where it has "directly spoken to the precise
question at issue").
128. See 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000) (authorizing only EPA to regulate pesticides).
129. See PIERCE, supra note 96, § 3.5, at 13, 25 (Supp. 2006).
130. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001).
131. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 591 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). For a longer
version of Justice Scalia's views on this issue, see his dissenting opinion in Mead, 533 U.S. at
239-50.
132. See, e.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-31 (majority opinion).
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term in office.13 He probably will not be able to get all of those
policies approved even during his second term if he is fortunate
enough to be re-elected.' By contrast, Justice Scalia's broader
approach to Chevron would allow a President to get most of his
preferred policies approved and in effect within a couple of years of
taking office. 3 ' Because Chevron deference can yield judicial
approval of a policy only if the agency can convince a court that its
announced policy is reasonable and within the boundaries Congress
has established by statute,' the Court could further the political
and constitutional goals of Chevron far more effectively if it were to
modify the Chevron doctrine by adopting Justice Scalia's approach
to its scope. 37
133. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
135. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (describing the
two-part inquiry).
137. While the results of the Court's opinion in Dow illustrate the desirability of a change
in the scope of Chevron, any defensible change in doctrine would not alter the outcome of the
particular dispute resolved in Dow. As argued in Part II.C, the Court probably would have
upheld an interpretation of FIFRA in which EPA announced both that it had resumed
responsibility to regulate pesticide efficacy, including the accuracy of proposed labeling as it
relates to efficacy and risk of crop damage, and that its approval of a proposed pesticide label
preempts a state tort suit based on alleged fraud or failure to warn. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text. EPA would have no difficulty, however, persuading the Court that such
a change in policy is reasonable and within the statutory boundaries of its discretion. That
change of policy would require a large increase in the resources made available to EPA for
pesticide regulation. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
The Bush Administration did not attempt to make that change in policy. Instead, the Bush
Administration attempted to change EPA's policies by retaining EPA's preexisting
refusal/inability to regulate pesticide efficacy, including its inability to review the accuracy
of proposed pesticide labels as they relate to efficacy and risk of crop damage, while
simultaneously announcing that all state regulation of pesticide labeling related to efficacy
and risk of crop damage is preempted. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. EPA
likely would not be able to convince a court that such a peculiar combination of policies is
either reasonable or consistent with the statutory boundaries on its discretion.
When Congress prohibited a state from imposing a labeling requirement "in addition to or
different from" labeling required by FIFRA, Congress likely assumed that EPA would regulate
each aspect of a pesticide's labeling, and Congress included the labeling preemption provision
in FIFRA to obtain uniformity in regulating pesticide labeling. EPA doubtlessly could choose
to regulate pesticide labeling, as it relates to efficacy and risk to crops, and prohibit states
from engaging in duplicative and potentially conflicting regulation of that subject matter, if
Congress gave it the resources required to perform that task. In that situation, preemption
of all state regulation of labeling would further the statutory goal of assuring uniformity in
labeling regulation. EPA would not be acting in a manner consistent with FIFRA, however,
if it continued to refuse to regulate an important aspect of pesticide labeling and
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
III. THE MEANING OF MODIFICATION IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. The Policy Dispute
In 1970, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) that applied expensive New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS) to all major new stationary sources of air pollution,
including coal-fired generating plants.'38 Old generating plants,
however, were exempt from the new requirements. Congress
believed that owners of old plants should not be required to engage
in expensive retrofitting of old plants that were likely to be retired
from service in the near future; thus, the NSPS requirements
applied only to new plants or plants that had been modified."3 9 The
statute defined a modification as "any physical change in, or change
in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases
the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source. '' 4 ° In 1977,
Congress enacted another amendment to CAA that implemented a
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program that requires
any owner of a major stationary source constructed after 1977 to
obtain a special permit and to comply with expensive new air
pollution control rules. ' 4 'The 1977 amendment defined construction
to include modification and followed its reference to modification
with a parenthetical, "(as defined in [the preexisting NSPS provision
of CAA]).' 142
simultaneously asserted that states lack any power to regulate that area. When Congress
limited state regulatory power in FIFRA by prohibiting states from imposing labeling
requirements "in addition to or different from" EPA labeling requirements, it was attempting
to further the goal of uniformity and consistency in pesticide regulation. Congress was not
creating a legal regime in which no institution, at any level of government, can regulate
labeling claims related to a pesticide's efficacy or to the risk that it will cause crop damage.
Such a regime would leave farmers with no source of legal protection from damage
attributable to fraud or intentional mislabeling by pesticide manufacturers.
138. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
139. See id. § 111, 84 Stat. at 1683-84.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000).
141. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977); Safe
Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14, 91 Stat. 1393 (1977).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(c) (2001).
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Congress did not anticipate much controversy about the meaning
of modification in these two amendments. It assumed that most of
the old, relatively high-polluting coal-fired generating plants would
be retired within a few years after the enactment of the amend-
ments. That assumption proved to be mistaken. Most of the
preexisting coal-fired plants are still in operation today, primarily
because they are the lowest cost source of electricity in the
country.'43 Indeed, those plants generate more electricity today than
when Congress amended CAA in the 1970s, and they account for
over half of the electricity consumed in the United States today.'
All of those plants have been the subject of engineering projects that
have rendered them quite different from the plants that existed in
the 1970s.145 The typical preexisting coal-fired generating plant now
has greater capacity to generate electricity and lower emissions of
pollutants per unit of electricity generated.146 The question that has
arisen repeatedly with respect to virtually all of the old coal-fired
plants is whether major construction projects that allow the plants
to generate more electricity with lower per unit emissions constitute
modifications within the meaning of the PSD provisions of CAA.147
If they do, they were illegal when they were implemented and the
owners of the plants must now either retire each plant or retrofit
each with extraordinarily expensive new pollution control technol-
ogy.
14 8
143. See NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND
ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE xiii (2000).
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 2005)
(noting that Duke Energy implemented twenty-nine major engineering projects on coal-fired
plants between 1988 and 2000, which cost as much as seven times the original cost of
constructing the plant).
146. See id. at 544-45 (noting that the Duke Energy plant projects resulted in increased
total emissions because of increased productivity rather than any increase in hourly emissions
rates).
147. See id.
148. See id.
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EPA issued rules that defined modification in 197 1,149
1975,150 1978,151 1980,152 1992,1s and 2002.11 However, with three
exceptions, 155 none of those rules addressed the most important
recurring issue that arises in EPA's dealings with owners of old
coal-fired generating plants. 5 ' The statute defines a modification as
a "change ... which increases the amount of any air pollutant
emitted by such source." 57 What if the owner of a facility imple-
ments a project that allows the facility to decrease the pollutants it
emits per unit of electricity generated-but that also allows the
facility to generate so much more electricity that the aggregate
quantity of some pollutant it emits increases, even though the per
unit quantity emitted decreases substantially? Does that qualify as
an "increase" in emissions of a pollutant, causing implementation
of the project to be deemed a "modification," and thereby triggering
the expensive NSPS and PSD requirements of CAA?
The 1971, 1978, and 1980 EPA rules that defined modification did
not address that issue.5 8 The 1975 rule addressed the issue by
excluding "[ajn increase in the hours of operation or in the produc-
tion rate" from the definition of a "change" that might otherwise
qualify as a modification.'59 That rule applied only to the definition
of modification in the NSPS provisions, however, and not to the
definition in the PSD provisions. 60
149. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876 (Dec. 23,
1971).
150. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416 (Dec. 16,
1975).
151. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 43
Fed. Reg. 26,380 (June 19, 1978).
152. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45
Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980).
153. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 57
Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992).
154. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review, 67
Fed. Reg. 80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002).
155. See supra notes 150, 153-54.
156. See supra notes 149, 151-52.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000).
158. See supra notes 149, 151-52.
159. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(iii)(f) (2005).
160. See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2005).
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The 1992 rule applied to both NSPS and PSD.16  It excluded from
the definition of modification any increase in emissions that was
caused by increased demand for the output of a facility that was
independent of any physical change to the facility.'62 No court ever
resolved the dispute with respect to the legality of that rule,
however, and the rule did not apply to the scores of engineering and
construction projects that facility owners implemented before
1992.163 Facility owners challenged the validity of the 1992 rule, but
the D.C. Circuit stayed the review proceedings to allow EPA to
complete a new rulemaking that ultimately produced the 2002
rule."
The 2002 rule also applies to both NSPS and PSD.'65 It retains
parts of the 1992 rule, but it has two changes that, in the aggregate,
reduce significantly the number of facilities and projects that qualify
as modifications.'" It allows a facility owner to use its emissions in
any year within a ten-year lookback period to compare its past
emissions with its present or future emissions to determine whether
its emissions have increased, rather than the two-year lookback
period that previously applied." 7 It also reaffirms the exclusion for
demand growth and expands that exclusion to cover facilities in
addition to electric generating plants.'68 The 2002 rule was upheld
in a 2005 D.C. Circuit opinion.'69 By its terms, however, the 2002
rule does not apply to any activity that took place prior to 2002.170
Indeed, it cannot apply retroactively because the Supreme Court
issued an opinion in 1988 that prohibits agencies from issuing rules
with retroactive effects.' 7'
161. Requirement for Preparation Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 57
Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992).
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3,16 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
165. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review, 67
Fed. Reg. 80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 80,278.
168. Id. at 80,277.
169. New York, 413 F.3d at 10.
170. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review, 68
Fed. Reg. 61,248, 61,264 (Oct. 27, 2003).
171. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988).
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Shortly after it issued its 1980 rule, EPA interpreted its definition
of modification, for PSD purposes, to allow a facility owner to
implement a project that had the effect of increasing its aggregate
emissions of a pollutant, only because of increased output from the
unit, without obtaining a PSD permit or otherwise complying with
the expensive PSD requirements; EPA took the position that a
project caused an increase in emissions only if it had the effect of
increasing the emissions per unit of output.'72 EPA did not an-
nounce that interpretation in a rule or a formal adjudication,
however.173 EPA's Director of the Division of Stationary Source
Enforcement announced the interpretation in the context of
decisions declining to take enforcement actions against facilities
that implemented projects increasing total emissions because of
increased output but reducing emissions per unit of output.174 The
1980 interpretation of modification was an important part of
President Carter's effort to reduce the nation's dependence on
expensive and politically insecure sources of imported oil by
increasing consumption of inexpensive domestic coal supplies.'75
In 1999 and 2000, however, EPA initiated a large number of
highly publicized enforcement actions against virtually all owners
of coal-fired generating stations.'76 Those actions were a major part
of President Clinton's effort to reduce air pollution.' In each action,
EPA alleged that the facility owner had acted illegally during the
1980 to 1999 period by implementing projects that had the effect of
increasing aggregate emissions of one or more pollutant from each
facility. 7 ' In each case, the project had not increased emissions per
unit of output; emissions had increased solely because the facility
172. See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2005).
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. President Carter's plan to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil by substituting coal
for oil is described in RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., GARY D. ALLISON & PATRICK H. MARTIN,
ECONOMIC REGULATION: ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION, AND UTILITIES 445-51, 837-68 (1980); see
also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Introduction: Symposium on the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act of 1978, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 297, 297 (1981) (discussing the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978).
176. See United States v. Ala. Power Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1285 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
177. See id. (noting the number and geographic scope of these EPA enforcement actions,
which were near the end of the Clinton Administration).
178. See, e.g., id. at 1290.
590 [Vol. 48:559
DEMOCRATIZING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
was being used to produce more electricity.'79 EPA alleged that the
projects constituted modifications within the meaning of that term
as used in the 1980 PSD rules, because the projects enabled the
owner to increase the rate of utilization of the facility, thereby
increasing aggregate emissions from the facility."0 In each case, the
facility owner defended its past conduct by arguing that a project
implemented with respect to an old coal-fired generating plant
qualified as a modification for PSD purposes only if the project
produced an increase in emissions of pollutants per unit of output,
which was not the case with respect to any of the scores of old plants
that had undergone major projects between 1980 and 1999.8 '
B. Court Opinions Addressing the Dispute About the Meaning of
Modification
Between 2003 and 2005, five courts issued opinions in which they
reviewed EPA interpretations of modification, as that term is used
in the context of the CAA PSD provisions. 8 2 In opinions issued in
2003, two district courts decided that Congress had unambiguously
resolved the question of the meaning of modification and, thus, that
EPA had no discretion with respect to the meaning of the term and
a court owed no deference to any EPA interpretation of the term.8 3
Those courts, however, resolved the issue of law in inconsistent
ways.8 4 The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
179. See, e.g., id.
180. See id. at 1289-90.
181. See id. at 1290.
182. See infra notes 183-218 and accompanying text. In New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880,
889-90 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the D.C. Circuit rejected another rule in which EPA attempted to
define a modification to exclude any project implemented at a cost less than twenty percent
of the cost of replacing the entire facility. That opinion is unrelated to the dispute discussed
in this Article. In United States v. Cinergy Corp., No. 06-1224, 2006 WL 2371358, at **1-4 (7th
Cir. Aug. 17, 2006), the Seventh Circuit rejected a utility's arguments that (1) Congress
unambiguously decided that a plant modification takes place only when the plant is changed
in a way that increases its hourly rate of emissions, and (2) EPA must give modification the
same meaning in the contexts of the PSD and NSPS programs. Remarkably, however, after
the court concluded that the statutory term is ambiguous, it did not discuss at all the critical
question of which, if any, agency interpretation of the term is due deference. As a result, the
opinion is so incomplete that it is difficult to determine its significance.
183. See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 640 (M.D.N.C. 2003);
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833-35 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
184. As the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama characterized the two
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held that EPA was required to define modification to exclude a
project that increased emissions only because it enabled the facility
to increase its output,"s while the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held that EPA was required to define modification
to include such a project.1" By contrast, all three of the court
opinions issued in 2005 concluded that the statutory term "modifica-
tion" is ambiguous. Those opinions were issued by the District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama,"8 7 the Fourth Circuit,18 and
the D.C. Circuit.18 9
In United States v. Alabama Power Co., the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama was required to determine the
meaning of modification in the context of an enforcement proceeding
in which EPA urged the court to hold that a firm violated the PSD
provisions of CAA by implementing projects, during the period 1980
to 1999, that increased aggregate emissions from facilities only
because the firm increased its rate of output from the facilities.190
EPA could prevail only if the court accepted EPA's 1999 interpreta-
tion of "modification," rather than its 1980 or 2003 interpretation.
The court first concluded that the term "modification" is
ambiguous.' 9 ' The court then stated: "As an abstract principle, the
court agrees with EPA ... that deference is due the EPA in the
agency's interpretation of the CAA's ... increased emissions provi-
sions. '
The court then turned to the question of which of the inconsistent
EPA interpretations were entitled to deference.193 It refused to defer
opinions: "Both courts grounded their opinions on analysis of the statute. Both courts
reasoned that the statute mandated the result reached. The courts reached diametrically
opposed conclusions." Ala. Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
185. Duke Energy, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 640.
186. Ohio Edison, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 833, 835.
187. Ala. Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
188. United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F. 3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub
nom., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Duke Energy Crop., 126 S. Ct. 2019 (2006).
189. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit also concluded that
the term "modification" is ambiguous in its 2006 opinion in United States v. Cinergy Corp. See
supra note 182.
190. See Ala. Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1290-92.
191. Id. at 1300-02.
192. Id. at 1305.
193. See id. at 1300.
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to the interpretation announced in EPA's 2003 rule.'94 The court
noted that the 2003 rule, by its terms, applies only to conduct that
took place after the rule was issued, while all of the conduct at issue
in the case before the court took place well before 2003.195 The court
also refused to defer to the 1999 interpretation EPA urged in its
brief.'96 The court reasoned that an interpretation announced in a
brief is not entitled to Chevron deference but only to the weaker and
more contingent form of deference described in Skidmore.197 The
court concluded that it should not confer Skidmore deference on that
agency interpretation because it was inconsistent with both the
informal interpretation EPA announced in declining to take
enforcement actions in 1980 and the formal interpretation EPA
announced in its 2003 rule.'98 The court was particularly troubled
by EPA's argument that a court should defer in 2005 to an interpre-
tation that was inconsistent with the agency's prior interpretation
and that the agency had formally rejected in the rule it issued in
2003. In the court's words:
Finally, if one compares the 2003 Rule ... with this civil action,
what one sees is one office of EPA attempting to expand and
clarify the ... provisions [that exempt facilities from PSD]
through rulemaking, while another is attempting to redefine
them through enforcement actions and litigation.'
... This leaves the anomaly of utilities, like APC, being
prosecuted for conduct that, if engaged in now, would not be
prosecuted. Put another way, this action is a sport, which is not
exactly what one would expect to find in a national regulatory
enforcement program.2 E
After concluding that EPA had not issued any interpretation of
modification to which the court should defer, the district court
adopted its own preferred interpretation of modification: "Emissions
increases, for purposes of NSR/PSD analysis, are calculated only on
194. Id. at 1300-01.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1305-06 & n.42.
197. Id. at 1306.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1306 n.44.
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the basis of 'maximum hourly emission rates', not 'annual actual
emissions'. Maximum hourly emissions must increase before PSD
permitting is triggered; greater annual facility utilization is
irrelevant to the analysis."' '
The Fourth Circuit addressed the same issues in a virtually
identical context in its 2005 opinion in United States v. Duke Energy
Corp.2"2 The court held that modification was ambiguous with
respect to the meaning of an increase in emissions. 20 ' The court thus
emphasized that EPA has the power to adopt by rule either of the
competing definitions of modification.0 4 The court also concluded,
however, that Congress did not give EPA discretion to interpret
modification to have different meanings in the contexts of the NSPS
and PSD programs. 2" The-court recognized that Congress can, and
sometimes does, permit an agency to define the same statutory term
in different ways when the term is used for different purposes, and
the court recognized that there are "vital differences" between the
PSD and NSPS programs.2 6 Still, the court concluded that the
language Congress used in the 1977 amendment unambiguously
required EPA to define modification the same way for both pur-
poses.20 7 To the Fourth Circuit, the critical sentence in the definition
section of the 1977 PSD amendments was this: '"The term 'construc-
tion' when used in connection with any source or facility, includes
the modification (as defined in [the analogous section of the NSPS
provisions]) of any source or facility."208 Because all parties,
including EPA, agreed that EPA had issued a rule in 1975 that
excluded increases in emissions attributable to increased output
from the definition of modification in NSPS, the court concluded
that EPA was required to use the same definition for purposes of
201. Id. at 1307.
202. 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005).
203. The court did not actually state that the term is ambiguous, but it stated that "EPA
retains its authority to amend ... this and other regulations 'through exercise of appropriate
rulemaking powers."' Id. at 550. EPA could not make such a change in interpretation by rule
unless the statutory term it is interpreting is ambiguous.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 546-50.
206. Id. at 549.
207. Id. at 550.
208. Id. at 543.
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PSD unless and until EPA issues a rule that changes the definition
of modification for both purposes." 9
The third 2005 opinion that discussed the interpretation of
modification was the D.C. Circuit's opinion in New York v. EPA.210
The issue, however, arose in a different context in that case.211 The
court reviewed the validity of the rule EPA issued in 2002.212 That
rule interpreted modification to exclude most projects that increase
emissions by enabling a facility to increase its output; it allowed a
facility owner to choose any year in a ten-year lookback period to
use as the baseline from which to determine whether an increase in
emissions has occurred, and excluded any increase in emissions
attributable only to growth in demand for the output of the
facility. 213 The court first held that the statutory definition of
modification was ambiguous, and then upheld EPA's new interpre-
tation of that term as reasonable. 214 Because the interpretation was
announced in a legislative rule, the court applied Chevron deference
to EPA's interpretation.215
The court noted that "EPA is entitled to balance environmental
concerns with economic and administrative concerns. '216 That is
clearly what EPA did when it issued its 2003 rule. Of course, EPA
engaged in the same balancing process when it adopted the quite
different interpretation of modification for the purpose of taking the
plethora of enforcement actions it initiated in 1999 and 2000. The
different outcomes of the two balancing processes should come as no
surprise to anyone who follows politics. The EPA interpretation
from 1999 to 2000 was reflective of the policies of President Clinton,
while the 2003 interpretation was reflective of the policies of
President Bush.217 Indeed, in 2005 EPA proposed a new definition
of modification that would give facility owners even greater
209. Id. at 550-51. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Fourth Circuit on this issue in
its 2006 opinion in United States u. Cinergy Corp. See supra note 182.
210. 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
211. See id. at 10.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 20-27, 39.
215. Id. at 17-18.
216. Id. at 23.
217. See Juliet Eilperin, EPA Issues Draft Rules on Plants' Emissions, WASH. POST, Oct.
14, 2005, at A4; Juliet Eilperin, New Rules Could Allow Power Plants To Pollute More, WASH.
POST, Aug. 31, 2005, at Al.
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discretion to make large changes to their old facilities, without
having to obtain a PSD permit or to install the extraordinarily
expensive pollution control equipment required to comply with the
PSD rules.21
C. Doctrinal Critique of the Opinions Interpreting Modification
It is particularly important to determine whether the five recent
court opinions that review EPA's interpretations of modification are
doctrinally sound. The Supreme Court will resolve this dispute
during its 2006-2007 Term,21' and the Court is likely to resolve it
through application of prevailing doctrines. Thus, a hypothetical,
doctrinally sound resolution of the issue is likely to replace the
doctrinally flawed and inconsistent lower court opinions that have
been issued through 2005.
The two courts that issued opinions in which they reviewed EPA's
interpretation of modification in 2003 held that Congress unambigu-
ously resolved the question of how to determine whether a major
construction project implemented at a facility increases its emis-
sions of a pollutant and, hence, constitutes a modification for PSD
purposes. 20 The reasoning in each of those opinions detracts from
the plausibility of the conclusion in the other, however, because each
court concluded that Congress clearly resolved the issue in a
manner diametrically opposed to the other court's conclusion.2 21 The
three courts that issued opinions on this issue in 2005 concluded
that the statutory definition of modification is ambiguous in its
potential application to a facility that has increased its total
emissions solely because it has increased its output, even though
the changes made to the facility decreased its rate of emissions per
unit of output.2
22
218. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration, Nonattainment New Source Review, and
New Source Performance Standards, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,081 (Oct. 20, 2005); supra note 217.
219. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Duke Energy Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2019 (2006) (granting petition for
writ of certiorari).
220. See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 640 (M.D.N.C. 2003);
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833-35 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
221. See United States v. Ala. Power Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1296 (N.D. Ala. 2005)
(discussing the opposing conclusions).
222. See New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 20-27 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Duke
Energy, 411 F.3d 539, 550 (4th Cir. 2005); Ala. Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1300-02.
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The courts that concluded that the statutory term is ambiguous
have the better of this argument. The CAA defines modification
with reference to a project that has the effect of increasing emis-
sions of any pollutant, but it leaves the term "increase" undefined.22
In that situation, increase can refer either to an increase in
aggregate emissions, due solely to an increase in output, or to an
increase in the rate of emissions per unit of output. As the D.C.
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit concluded, giving meaning to the
term "increase" in the context of the PSD provisions of CAA requires
some institution to make a policy decision in which it must balance
the two conflicting goals of the Clean Air Act-reducing air pollution
and enhancing or preserving economic prosperity.224
When EPA interprets modification in a manner that permits a
facility owner to implement a project that simultaneously reduces
emissions per unit and increases output from the facility without
having to comply with the expensive PSD rules, it is arguably
furthering the policy goals of the CAA by refraining from inadver-
tently discouraging utilities from implementing socially beneficial
projects that allow utilities to continue to generate electricity in the
lowest cost facilities available today, with a resulting decrease in
emissions of pollutants per unit of electricity generated. When EPA
interprets modification in a manner that has the effect of applying
the PSD rules to almost any project implemented at an old, high-
polluting plant, it is arguably furthering the policy goals of CAA by
encouraging the owners of the highest polluting sources of electricity
in the country to replace those old facilities with modern, low-
polluting facilities. The two district courts that adopted their own
interpretations of modification ignored the Supreme Court's
admonition in Chevron that politically unaccountable judges should
not substitute their own policy preferences for those of a politically
accountable agency.225 The three courts that concluded that
modification is ambiguous acted in a manner that was true to the
Chevron doctrine.226
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (2000).
224. New York, 413 F.3d at 23; Duke Energy, 411 F.3d at 550-51. The Seventh Circuit
reached the same conclusion in United States v. Cinergy Corp. See supra note 182.
225. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
226. See id.
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The D.C. Circuit concluded that the statutory term "modification"
is ambiguous and then upheld as reasonable EPA's interpretation
announced in its 2003 rule.227 Because the rule is legislative, the
D.C. Circuit properly invoked Chevron deference in the process of
upholding EPA's interpretation.228
Even though it concluded that modification is ambiguous, the
Fourth Circuit also concluded that Congress had unambiguously
required EPA to define modification in the same manner for
purposes of both the NSPS program and the PSD program.229 That
conclusion required EPA to define modification to exclude a change
in a facility that increases emissions only by enabling the facility to
increase its output for PSD purposes, because EPA had issued a
legislative rule in 1975 that defined modification in that manner in
the context of the NSPS program.3 ° If the Fourth Circuit is right
with respect to its conclusion that Congress required EPA to give
modification the same meaning for both purposes, the rest of the
court's conclusions follow logically through application of well-
established administrative law doctrines. A court owes deference to
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered
statute when the agency announces that interpretation in a
legislative rule, and an agency can only amend a legislative rule by
issuing another legislative rule.23' The Fourth Circuit, however, was
wrong to conclude that EPA lacks the discretion to adopt different
interpretations of modification for NSPS and PSD purposes.232 In
227. See New York, 413 F.3d at 20-27 (applying Chevron analysis).
228. See id. at 17-18.
229. See Duke Energy, 411 F.3d at 546-47.
230. See id. at 550.
.231. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
232. Until 2005, this element of the Fourth Circuit's opinion was clearly inconsistent with
prevailing doctrine. As the Fourth Circuit was forced to admit, it and other courts, including
the Supreme Court, have upheld different agency interpretations of the same ambiguous word
that Congress used in two places in a statute, where the contexts in which the word is used
differ. See Duke Energy, 411 F.3d at 550. The 2005 opinion by a seven-Justice majority in
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), however, requires reconsideration of this view. In
Clark, the Supreme Court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is required
to give the same statutory phrase the same meaning in two quite different contexts. Id. at
386. The majority reasoned that its holding was required to avoid establishing "the dangerous
principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases."
Id.
The impact of the Court's opinion in Clark is uncertain. It is potentially distinguishable
from the cases reviewing EPA's different definitions of modification on two bases-INS never
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any event, the Fourth Circuit recognized that EPA could change its
1975 interpretation of modification for purposes of both the PSD
program and the NSPS program. The Fourth Circuit also concluded,
however, that EPA could make such a change only by using the
cumbersome and time-consuming legislative rulemaking process to
amend its preexisting legislative rule that defined modification for
purposes of the NSPS program.
233
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama concluded
that modification is ambiguous and stated that, "[a]s an abstract
principle," it was required to defer to any reasonable EPA interpre-
tation of modification. 234 The court then refused to defer to the
interpretation EPA announced in its 2003 rule because, even though
EPA announced that interpretation in a form that renders it subject
to Chevron deference, the rule has prospective effect only, and all of
the conduct at issue before the court took place prior to 2003.235 The
announced an interpretation of the statutory text at issue in Clark in a form that was even
arguably entitled to Chevron deference, and the term "modification" in CAA is not "the same
statutory text"; rather, it is the same word used in different parts of the same statute. Id.
Moreover, as Jonathan Siegel has shown, the Supreme Court has frequently embraced the
principle the Clark majority rejected as dangerous. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic
Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REv. 339,343-65 (2005).
In fact, as recently as 2004, the Supreme Court characterized as a "presumption" the canon
of construction that the same term has the same meaning in every context when it is used in
the same statute. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004). The Court
went on to explain that the "presumption is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is
such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the
conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the Act with different intent." Id. at
595 (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)).
Siegel has also argued that courts should continue that practice in the many circumstances
in which a court can further the goals of a statute most effectively by adopting different
interpretations of the same ambiguous statutory language in different contexts. Siegel, supra,
at 365-85. Siegel's arguments are persuasive. They apply with particular force to a situation
in which a politically accountable agency gives different meanings to the same word when
that word is used in two quite different contexts in the same statute. In that context, the court
should simply cite Chevron and defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of the
ambiguous word. The Fourth Circuit now seems to agree on that point. See Yi v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 533-35 (4th Cir. 2005). In an opinion issued after the Fourth Circuit
issued its opinion in Duke, and after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Clark, the
Fourth Circuit upheld a Bureau of Prisons decision in which the agency gave the same term
different meanings in different contexts, even though the term was used in the same sentence
of the same statute. Id.; see also United States v. Cinergy Corp., No. 06-1224, 2006 WL
2371358, at **1-5 (7th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006).
233. See Duke Energy, 411 F.3d at 550.
234. United States v. Ala. Power Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d. 1283, 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
235. Id. at 1300-01.
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court also refused to defer to the contrary interpretation EPA urged
in its brief submitted in the case before the court because that
interpretation was announced in a form that entitled it only to the
weaker and contingent form of deference the Court described in
Skidmore.2"6 The court concluded that the interpretation EPA urged
in its brief was not entitled to Skidmore deference because it was
inconsistent both with EPA's prior interpretation announced by a
senior enforcement official in 1980 and with EPA's present interpre-
tation reflected in EPA's 2003 rule.2 7 Lacking any agency interpre-
tation to which it was willing to defer, the court announced and
applied its own preferred interpretation-a facility has been
modified for PSD purposes only if it has been changed in a way that
increases its emissions per unit of output.238
The District Court applied prevailing doctrine when it declined to
defer retroactively to the interpretation EPA announced in its 2003
rule, but it departed from applicable doctrine when it held that the
interpretation EPA urged in its brief was entitled only to Skidmore
deference. 239 The interpretation EPA adopted and announced in the
context of bringing the enforcement actions it initiated in 1999 and
2000 was not just an interpretation of ambiguous language in an
agency-administered statute, it was also an interpretation of the
ambiguous language in the legislative rule EPA issued in 1980.240
As such, it was entitled to Seminole Rock deference. 2 1 That form of
deference is stronger than Skidmore deference and, unlike Skidmore
deference, is not contingent on consistency in the agency's interpre-
tation of the rule.242 Moreover, unlike Chevron deference, Seminole
Rock deference necessarily applies to agency interpretations
announced through use of procedures less formal than notice-and-
comment rulemaking or a decision issued in a formal adjudica-
tion.243 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a court must confer
Seminole Rock deference on at least some agency interpretations of
236. Id. at 1306.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1306-07.
239. See supra Part I.B.
240. See United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 545-56 (4th Cir. 2005).
241. See supra Part I.C.
242. See id.
243. PIERCE, supra note 96, § 6.11.
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ambiguous agency rules that are announced only as litigating
positions in briefs.244
Seminole Rock requires a court to give an agency's interpretation
of an ambiguous rule "controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." '245 The District Court
did not conclude, and could not have concluded, that the agency's
1999 interpretation of its ambiguous 1980 rule was either "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation," 4 6 so the court should
have deferred to that interpretation. There are three bases on which
the court might have attempted to defend its decision not to defer to
EPA's interpretation of its 1980 rule, but the court did not mention
any of the three.24 ' Part III.E of this Article will discuss those
potential bases for escaping from the duty to defer to an agency's
interpretation of a rule.
The District Court also departed from precedent when it gave
the ambiguous term "modification" the court's own preferred
meaning. 4 ' A court has no choice but to adopt its own preferred
construction of an ambiguous provision in an agency-administered
statute when the agency has not announced an interpretation to
which the court can defer.249 That was not the situation the district
court confronted. It was required to defer to EPA's interpretation of
its 1980 rule, and because that rule is a legislative rule, EPA's
interpretation also resolves the ambiguity in the statutory definition
of modification."'
D. Normative Critique of the Opinions on the Meaning of
Modification
Part III.C concluded that the three 2005 opinions reviewing EPA
interpretations of the term "modification," as that term is used in
the PSD provisions of CAA, accurately applied prevailing doctrines
244. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
245. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).
246. Id.
247. See infra notes 263-96 and accompanying text.
248. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
249. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700-01 ("[A]
court's interpretation of a statute trumps an agency's under the doctrine of stare decisis only
if the prior court's holding determined a statute's clear meaning.").
250. See supra Part I.C.
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when they concluded that the term is ambiguous,25 ' that the D.C.
Circuit acted in a manner consistent with prevailing doctrine when
it upheld the interpretation of modification EPA announced in its
2003 rule,252 and that the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama accurately applied prevailing doctrine when it declined to
apply the statutory interpretation EPA announced in its 2003 rule
retroactively. 253 It also concluded that the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama acted in a manner inconsistent with
prevailing doctrine when it refused to defer to EPA's interpretation
of its 1980 rule defining modification and when it adopted its own
preferred interpretation of the statutory term "modification.'254
Finally, Part III.C concluded that the Fourth Circuit was wrong
when it asserted that EPA must give modification the same
meaning in the context of both the NSPS program and the PSD
program.2
55
If this doctrinal critique is correct, any court that applies
prevailing doctrines accurately to the scores of pending EPA CAA
enforcement actions will have no choice but to defer to EPA's 1999
interpretation of modification that it continues to urge courts to
apply in its ongoing enforcement proceedings in 2006. That result,
however, is troubling for two reasons. First, like the results of
applying prevailing doctrines in Dow, 256 it has the effect of requiring
a court in 2006 to reject the policy preferred by the incumbent
President in favor of the contrary policy of his predecessor, even
though the incumbent took office five years earlier in 2001. Second,
it raises the concerns about fairness and regularity expressed by the
District Judge in the Alabama Power case.257 It does not seem right
to conclude that a firm violated the law during the period between
1980 and 1999, and to require the firm to incur hundreds of millions
of dollars of mandated costs, based on an interpretation of an
ambiguous rule and statute that the government did not announce
until 1999. The unfairness is particularly egregious when the firm
251. See supra notes 219-28, 233 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
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acted on the basis of the agency's contrary interpretation announced
in 1980, and when a court would have to conclude that the firm
acted in an entirely lawful manner if its conduct were to be judged
with reference to the definitive interpretation of the statute the
agency announced in 2003.
E. Potential Changes in Doctrine
These concerns about the unfortunate results of the application
of prevailing doctrines to the dispute with respect to the meaning of
modification motivates critical consideration of whether today's
prevailing doctrines make sense or whether we should change one
or more of those doctrines. There are several changes in doctrine
that could avoid the two adverse effects of applying prevailing
doctrine in these problematic enforcement cases. The Supreme
Court could overrule Seminole Rock and substitute a less powerful
and more contingent form of deference for Seminole Rock deference.
Such a change in doctrine would allow a court to refuse to defer to
EPA's 1999 interpretation of its 1980 rule. That, in turn, would
allow a court to adopt an interpretation of modification that is
consistent with the policy preferences of the incumbent President
and that would avoid penalizing firms for engaging in conduct that
they had no reason to believe was unlawful at the time the firms
engaged in the conduct.
John Manning wrote an excellent article in 1996 in which he
urged just such a change in doctrine.2"" Manning argued that courts
should not confer a strong form of deference on agency interpreta-
tions of ambiguous agency rules because such a doctrine of defer-
ence encourages agencies to issue ambiguous rulesY9 Manning
makes some good points, but his proposed change in doctrine is
misguided for two reasons. First, as Manning acknowledges,
adoption of his proposal would have costs of three types: it would
increase the power of politically unaccountable judges to substitute
their own preferred policies for those of politically accountable
agencies; it would discourage agencies from issuing rules; and it
258. See Manning, supra note 38.
259. Id. at 631-80 (discussing separation of powers).
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would delay final resolution of many policy disputes.26" Those costs
exceed the benefits of the doctrinal change Manning urges. Second,
while adoption of Manning's proposal would have a salutary effect
in the context of the pending CAA enforcement disputes, it would
have the opposite effect in most cases. One of the few ways in which
an agency can change its policies to reflect those of the incumbent
President expeditiously is to adopt an interpretation of an ambigu-
ous agency rule." 1 Seminole Rock then requires a court to defer to
the agency interpretation.262 Thus, by overruling Seminole Rock, the
Court would be exacerbating the problem of delay between the time
a President is elected and the time when the courts will allow his
policy preferences to replace those of his predecessor.
There are three more modest changes in existing doctrines that
offer some potential to avoid the adverse effects of applying existing
doctrines in the CAA enforcement cases. Each has some support in
judicial decisions.
First, courts, including the Supreme Court, have begun to refuse
to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules where
the rules were written in an extraordinarily open-ended manner.263
The Tenth Circuit explained the basis for this judicial tendency in
a 1998 opinion.2" In that case, the agency had issued a rule that did
little more than parrot the open-ended language of the statute the
rule was supposed to implement.265 The agency then attempted to
rely entirely on informal interpretations of its open-ended rule to
announce its interpretations of the statute.2 6 The court noted that
260. Id. at 690-96 (discussing objections to "the abandonment of binding deference to an
agency's interpretation").
261. See supra Part I.C.
262. See id.
263. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Meml Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 89-90 (1995) (dividing the
Court five-to-four with respect to same question); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504, 505-06 (1994) (dividing the Court five-to-four with respect to question whether agency
rule is too vague to justify deference to agency interpretation of rule). See discussion of these
cases in PIERCE, supra note 96, § 6.11.
264. See Mission Group Kan. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775, 782 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Pearson
v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the Administrative Procedure Act
requires an agency to give some definitional content to statutory language when it issues
rules).
265. Riley, 146 F.3d at 782-83 ("Mere consistency between the rule and the regulation does
not establish that the former is derived from the latter by a process fairly described as
interpretive.").
266. Id.
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Congress authorizes agencies to issue rules to implement statutes
primarily to provide a means through which an agency can particu-
larize the often vague and open-ended commands contained in
regulatory statutes.26 ' The court refused to defer to the agency's
interpretation of its rule because, by doing so, the court would
encourage agencies to substitute regulatory ambiguity for statutory
ambiguity, thereby making a "mockery of ... the [Administrative
Procedure Act]."26 The D.C. Circuit has provided a more colorful
explanation for this limit on Seminole Rock deference: "It is
certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and then give
it concrete form only through subsequent less formal 'interpreta-
tions."'269 A six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court explicitly
adopted the antiparroting exception to Seminole Rock deference in
its 2006 opinion in Gonzales v. Oregon."'
Application of the reasoning in Gonzales to the CAA enforcement
cases would avoid the troubling results. It would provide a potential
basis for a court to refuse to defer to the 1999 interpretation of
modification, thereby allowing the court to adopt instead the 2003
interpretation as its own. The Gonzales majority requires a rule to
clarify, in some meaningful way, the interpretive dispute that the
agency addresses in order to avoid judicial characterization of the
rule as a mere parroting rule that is not entitled to Seminole Rock
deference.' The 1980 EPA rule fails that test and should be
characterized as a mere parroting rule. 2 More broadly, general
application of the antiparroting exception to Seminole Rock
deference would have the beneficial effects of adoption of Manning's
proposal, without incurring the high costs attendant to adoption of
the Manning proposal.7 The disadvantage of this approach lies in
the difficulty of drawing the line between a rule that an agency is
free to interpret because it is merely ambiguous, and a rule that
adds so little to a vague provision of a statute that a court should
not confer deference on an agency interpretation of the rule. The
267. Id. at 782.
268. Id.
269. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
270. 126 S. Ct. 904, 915-16 (2006).
271. See id.
272. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 172-75.
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Supreme Court divided five-to-four in resolving two such line-
drawing disputes in the 1990s, 274 and six-to-three in resolving the
line-drawing dispute in Gonzales.17 ' As difficult as it may be to draw
that line in some cases, however, it is a line worth drawing. A good
argument can be made that the 1980 rule EPA interpreted in
bringing its enforcement proceedings in 1999 added so little to the
vague statutory definition of modification that courts should not
defer to agency interpretations of that rule.
A second promising approach is for a court to refuse to defer to an
agency interpretation of a rule when that interpretation is an-
nounced only as a litigating position and when there is reason to
believe that the interpretation is not "the agency's fair and consid-
ered judgment on the matter in question. 2 7' The D.C. Circuit
explained the basis for its reluctance to defer to agency interpreta-
tions of rules announced only as litigating positions in a 1997
opinion:
This reluctance to defer to agency counsel stems from two
concerns. First, ... counsel's interpretation may not reflect the
views of the agency itself. Second, it is likely that "a position
established only in litigation may have been developed hastily,
or under special pressure," and is not the result of the agency's
deliberative processes. However, as the Supreme Court has
recently affirmed, deference to an interpretation offered in the
course of litigation is still proper as long as it reflects the
"agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter." 77
The D.C. Circuit's approach makes a lot of sense. Agency supervi-
sion of agency lawyers is highly uneven.278 Sometimes the positions
a lawyer proposes to take in litigation have been discussed and
274. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
275. See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 915-16; id. at 927 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). The Court held that courts should defer to
agency interpretations of agency rules announced in briefs when they represent "the agency's
fair and considered judgment on the matter in question." Id. By implication, a court should
not defer to such an interpretation when it does not represent "the agency's fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question." See id.
277. Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
278. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
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approved at the highest levels of the agency." 9 In other cases,
however, no policy-making official has even considered, much less
approved, the position the lawyer is taking in litigation.28 °
If a court were to apply this approach to the interpretation of the
1980 rule that EPA urges in the pending enforcement cases, it
would have little difficulty concluding that the interpretation is not
the agency's "fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question." '281 After all, the policymaking officials in the agency have
announced policies in 2003 and 2005 that are the opposite of the
positions the agency's lawyers have taken in the enforcement
proceedings during the same time period.2"2 This strange situation
strongly supports the inference that the agency's lawyers are
engaged in a frolic of their own in the pending enforcement cases.
Third, a court could justify a refusal to defer to EPA's 1999
interpretation of its 1980 rule based on an equitable extension of an
administrative law doctrine that is rooted in the due process clause.
Courts regularly refuse to defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous rules in the context of enforcement proceedings in which
agencies seek to impose penalties on firms for violating agency
rules.283 A court will impose a penalty on a firm for violating an
ambiguous agency rule only if the court concludes that the agency
provided the firm with adequate notice that its conduct would
violate the rule before it engaged in the relevant conduct.2"
Direct application of this constitutionally based doctrine to the
CAA enforcement cases would have some beneficial effects. Because
EPA fell far short of providing adequate notice of its 1999 interpre-
tation of its 1980 rule before the firms implemented the changes to
their facilities during the period from 1980 to 1999, EPA cannot rely
on its 1999 interpretation as the basis to penalize the firms for
279. See, e.g., supra notes 172-75 (discussing EPA policy official's role in formulating 1980
interpretation of CAA modification of coal-fired plants).
280. See, e.g., supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing the Solicitor General's
involvement in announcing a policy change of EPA in Dow).
281. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
282. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding insufficient notice to find
violation of customer protection rule); Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (finding insufficient notice prevented EPA from holding company responsible). See the
discussion of numerous other cases with the same reasoning and holding in PIERCE, supra
note 96, § 6.11.
284. See supra note 283.
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engaging in that pre-1999 conduct. That direct effect of the adequate
notice requirement, however, would provide little real relief to the
firms who are defendants in those actions. If a court determines
that a firm violated the rule, and thus the statute, by making a
change in its facility that constituted a "modification" during the
period from 1980 to 1999, the firm is required to install new
pollution control technology that costs up to one billion dollars per
facility, or to abandon the facility, in order to comply with the PSD
provisions of CAA. Those regulatory compliance costs likely do not
qualify as a penalty for purposes of invocation of the adequate notice
requirement.285
A court would have to extend the adequate warning requirement,
or something like it, to costs of compliance with regulatory statutes,
as well as penalties, to relieve the defendants in these enforcement
cases from incurring scores of billions of dollars of costs-merely for
engaging in conduct that they reasonably believed to be free of all
regulatory costs at the time they took those actions. Two recent
precedents-a 2003 opinion of the Sixth Circuit28 and a 2004
opinion of the First Circuit 287-support just such an extension of the
adequate notice requirement in circumstances in which an agency
has affirmatively misled regulatees. Both opinions involved
attempts by the Department of Justice (DOJ), in enforcement
actions, to rely on a new interpretation of an agency rule as the
basis for its claim that regulatees were required to make extremely
expensive changes in their facilities.288
In 1992, DOJ issued a rule to implement the Americans with
Disabilities Act.289 The rule required owners of movie theaters to
provide seating for disabled individuals that allows them 'lines of
sight ... comparable" to those enjoyed by nondisabled people. 290 DOJ
proceeded to announce myriad inconsistent interpretations of that
rule over the following decade.29' Then, in 2000, DOJ initiated
285. For discussion of what constitutes a penalty, see PIERCE, supra note 96, § 6.11.
286. United States v. Cinemark, 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003).
287. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004).
288. See Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 563-64; Cinemark, 348 F.3d at 574-75.
289. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36.101 (2003).
290. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.308, 36.401-.402.
291. See Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 563, 569 (discussing inconsistent circuit opinions);
Cinemark, 348 F.3d at 573-74 (discussing DOJ standards).
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enforcement actions against several firms that had built hundreds
of new theaters during the time the rule was in effect.292 Each of the
theaters complied with the rule as it had been interpreted at the
time the theater was built, but none complied with the rule as DOJ
interpreted it for the first time in the enforcement proceedings.293
Both the Sixth Circuit and the First Circuit upheld DOJ's new
interpretation of the ambiguous rule, but both also concluded that
the defendants did not have adequate notice of the interpretation to
justify imposition of penalties against them.294 Both courts then
referred to the need for the district courts to apply equitable
principles in the enforcement actions on remand.295 In the words of
the First Circuit
[d]ue process may furnish a floor [against having to make large
expenditures], based primarily on lack of fair warning, but we
think that equitable principles give the district court even
greater latitude to decline or limit retroactivity. For example,
the court might equitably consider not only the level of warning
but also government indolence or misleading advice and the
avoidance of extravagant expenditure for little gain.2"
The equitable considerations alluded to by the First Circuit apply a
fortiori to the pending CAA enforcement proceedings. The govern-
ment should not be able to play games with regulatees by first
announcing an interpretation of a rule in 1980, encouraging them
to make large capital investments in improvements to their facilities
by assuring them that they are not thereby subjecting themselves
to massive regulatory costs, and then in 1999 announcing a new
interpretation that requires them to choose between spending
billions of dollars on those facilities or closing them.
If EPA had announced its 1999 interpretation of modification in
1980, owners of most old, coal-fired generating plants would have
closed them, rather than spending close to a billion dollars on each
to comply with PSD. Perhaps that would have been the better policy
292. See Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 563-64; Cinemark, 348 F.3d at 574-75 (discussing
procedural history).
293. See supra note 291.
294. See Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 571-73; Cinemark, 348 F.3d at 578-79, 581-82.
295. See Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 573-74; Cinemark, 348 F.3d at 581-83.
296. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 573.
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decision in 1980-though it would have increased our dependence
on oil imported from the Middle East, increased the price of
electricity significantly, and increased the severity of the stagflation
conditions that then plagued the economy. Perhaps that would be
the better policy decision today. EPA should be, and is, free to make
that policy decision at any time, as long as it makes the decision for
prospective application only. EPA should not be free, however, to
make that policy decision in 1999 with retroactive application to
conduct that took place before 1999.
CONCLUSION
This Article's analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in Dow,
and of the court decisions issued in response to the Clinton Adminis-
tration's efforts to redefine modification for CAA PSD purposes, has
uncovered two serious problems attributable to our current
administrative law doctrines. First, a newly elected President often
cannot get his policies announced in a form that courts will accept
for many years after he is elected.297 This problem produces such a
large lag between the election of a President and judicial acquies-
cence in his preferred policies, that government policies imple-
mented are at least one, and often two, presidential elections
behind. Second, through judicial application of our present defer-
ence doctrines, it is quite possible to get a situation in which
regulatees are required to make extremely large regulatory
expenditures for past actions that would be free of regulatory costs
today, and that the government encouraged them to take at the
time.29
The first problem is attributable, in large measure, to the
Supreme Court's refusal to defer to an agency's policy decision
reflected in a statutory interpretation unless, and until, the agency
announces that decision in either a legislative rule or a decision
issued in a formal adjudication.299 To reduce the magnitude of the
time lag problem, the Supreme Court should adopt Justice Scalia's
proposed broader approach to Chevron deference. 00 A court should
297. See supra Parts II.D, III.D.
298. See supra Part 1II.D.
299. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
300. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
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confer Chevron deference on an agency's reasonable interpretation
of ambiguous language in an agency-administered statute whenever
the agency announces its interpretation in a manner that reflects
the agency's "fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question." 0'
The second problem is attributable in part to the willingness of
courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous agency rules
in enforcement proceedings, even when the interpretation urged in
the enforcement proceeding is inconsistent with both the agency
interpretation announced before the conduct at issue and with the
agency's current rules. Courts should respond to that problem by
qualifying deference doctrine in three ways that have some support
in the case law: a court should not defer to an agency interpretation
of an agency rule that is open-ended and that merely parrots the
vague language of the statute it purports to implement; a court
should not defer to an agency interpretation of a rule when the
interpretation is announced only as a litigating position and when
there is reason to believe that the interpretation does not reflect
the agency's "fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question"e;3 °s and, a court should not allow an agency to apply
retroactively a new interpretation of an ambiguous rule when the
result would compel a regulatee to make large regulatory expendi-
tures because of conduct the agency encouraged the regulatee to
take.
301. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
302. Id.
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